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IN THE UTAH SUPRF:ME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Tf\'l' F: OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
BOYD DONALD RAGLF:Y, 
Def e nda nt-Appe l la nt. 
Case No. 19284 
STATEMENT OF Tl!F: NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Boyd Donald Ragley, was charged by 
infonnation with a violation of the following provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amerded: § 76-6-202, burglary; <;; 
41-6-13.5, failure to respond to officer's signal to 
76-6-404, theft; 76-8-506, filing a false report. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before the Honorable Homer F. 
\'lilkinson, sitting without a jury, in the Third Judicial 
District in and for Salt Lake County. Appellant was convicted 
of burglary, theft, and filing a false report. A stay of the 
execution of the sentence was granted, under the following 
conditions: 
1. The usual and ordinary conditions required by 
the Department of Adult Probation and Parole, 
2. Payment of a finP in the amri,rnt nf s7r,n. nn, 
3. Payment of restitution to he ckterminccl hy tlw 
Department of Adult Probation und Pu role, 
4. Complete the Prison Diversion Proqrum, and 
5. Complete the Weber County Alcohol Rehahilitati::in 
Program. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order affirming the judgment of 
the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 19, 1982, at 11:57 p.m., Officer Dave 
Smith was patrolling in the area of 3101) East 1300 South when 
he noticed a small, light-colored pickup parked at a Rainbo 
Service Station. The station appeared to he closed and Of-
ficer Smith went over to see if perhaps the tenant was simply 
late in leaving. As he drove by the station, Officer Smith 
observed a shattered window in the station and a Plale 
Caucasian grabbing items out of the cooler (T. 3-6). 
Officer Smith drove into the station, parking his 
car at an angle in front of the truck. As he was getting out 
of his car, the suspect was leaving the huilrling. ()fficer 
Smith drew his gun and ordered the suspect to stop several 
times. The suspect, however, continued towanl the truck 
saying, "Don't shoot me. Don't shoot me"(T. 7). The suspect 
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,,,L in the driver's side of the truck and started to back out. 
'c'!l11 the truck was backing up, Officer Smith reached into the 
''I'' n wiwlow of the rassenger sicle where a second individual 
sPatecl, pointed his gun at the suspect and ordered him to 
'top hut to no avail. '!'he clriver of the truck continued 
hacking slowly towards 33rd South while Officer Smith 
maintainecl his hold on the passenger. Officer Smith was 
dragged in this manner for approximately 75 feet at which 
point he became clislodqed and the truck took off headed west 
on 31rd South (T. 8-10). 
Officer Smith immediately returned to the patrol car 
and radioed dispatch to give a description of the truck. 
1iithin minutes there was a dispatch call of an accident 
involving the supected getaway truck approximately four blocks 
away. Officer Smith then went immediately to the scene of the 
accident where he identified the vehicle involved as the 
getaway truck (T. ln-11). At the scene of the accident, 
Officer Smith was shown a driver's license belonging to 
appellant, Boyd Donald Bagley (T. 32), found in the abandoned 
truck from which he identified the appellant as the burglary 
and the driver of the getaway truck. A couple of hours 
later Officer Smith was again shown the driver's license and 
he again iclent if ied the appellant as the burglary suspect and 
driver of the truck ( T. 20-21). 
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Later that morning, arpel lant not if iPd the rolice 
that his truck had been stolen. An appointment was arranqec1 
that same afternoon with Detective llrinqlrnrst for appellant tri 
file a theft report. During the meeting with Detective 
Bringhurst, appellant was ac1vised that he was a suspect in a 
burglary (T. 36-38). 
Officer Smith had occasion to be at division 
headquarters on an unrelated matter while appellant was being 
interviewed by Detective Bringhurst (T. lhl. Detective 
Bringhurst asked Officer Smith if he could identify the 
individual in his office. Initially Officer Smith was unable 
to make a positive identification (T. lR). Officer Smith left 
and returned to Detective Bringhurst's office about 25 minutes 
later. During the next few minutes Officer Smith observed 
appellant and listened while he was being questioned (T. 
19-20). Thereafter, he was able to make another positive 
identification of appellant as both the Rainbo burglar anc1 
getaway driver (T. 17). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE VERDICT. 
In Points I and III of his brief, appellant claims 
that his conviction was based upon insufficient evidence. The 
standard under which a claim of insufficency of the evinence 
-4-
mtist be juclgecl has been articulated many times by this Court. 
l\nst recently the Court has stated: 
Reducecl to essentials, the issue is simply 
whether there was evidence adduced at 
trial from which the jury coulcl have found 
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Contradictory testimony 
alone is not sufficient to clisturb a jury 
verclict. To overturn a verdict on appeal 
for insufficiency of evidence, this Court 
must find that reasonable mincls must 
necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt 
as to the clefendant' s guilt. State v. 
Watts, No. 18847, p.3, (Utah filed Dec. 
It is well established that this Court will overturn 
a verdict challenged on insufficiency of the evidence only 
"when the evidence is so lacking and insubstantial that a 
reasonable man could not possbily have reached a verdict 
beyond a reasonable cloubt." State v. Mccardell, Utah, 652 
P.2d 942, 945 (1982). Additionally, the Court has held it to 
be the exclusive function of the jury to determine the 
credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence. 
That the Court might view the eviclence as less than wholly 
conclusive is not sufficient to overturn the jury's verdict. 
State v. Howell, Utah, li49 P.2d 'll, 'l7 (1982). 
Appellant argues that because conflicting testimony 
was offered at trial the state somehow failed to meet its 
burden of proof and a finding of reasonable doubt is mandated. 
Appellant cites, State v. Wilson, TJtah, 'i65 P.2d 66, 68 (1977) 
to support his contention that any evidence offered is 
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sufficient to raise a reasonable noubt. A closer reaninq of 
the quoted portion, however, makes clear that "the evidence 
[of the defendant] be such as to create a reasonable nouht as 
to any element of the crime." Merely offering conflicting 
testimony does not of itself raise a reasonable noubt. The 
Court goes on in Wilson to state that it is a jury function to 
weigh the evidence. Id. at 68. The mere presentation of 
conflicting evidence by the accused does not preclune a 
finding of guilt beyond a reasonable nouht or no one could 
ever be convicted. State v. Carlsen, Utah, 638 P.2d 512 
(1981), cert. denied 102 S. Ct. 14fi9 (1982). In the absence 
of a jury, the trial court is authorized to determine the 
credibility of the witnesses and to believe or disbelieve any 
witness. Id. at 515. 
The evidence adduced at trial clearly supports the 
judge's verdict that appellant burglarized the Rainbo Service 
Station. The truck used as the getaway vehicle was positively 
identified just minutes after the incident by Officer Smith 
and was subsequently determined to belong to appellant. 
Appellant's wallet was in the truck with his driver's license. 
Officer Smith was shown the license at the accident scene and 
later at police headquarters. Both times he identified 
appellant as the burglary suspect. Smith mane two subsequent 
identifications of appellant as the Rainbo burglar: one in 
Detective Bringhurst's office and the other at trial. 
The defense offered three alibi witnesses who 
testified that appellant was home at the time of the burglary. 
-fi-
Two of these witnesses, appellant's girlfriend Tiffany 
Sorrells and another friend Rick Hall, were appellant's 
toornrnates. The third defense witness, Larinda Prisbrey, was 
JJall's girlfriend. All three of these witnesses testified 
that Lari nda had telephoned apf)ellant 's apartment at midnight 
on September 19, 1982 to talk to Hall and supposedly 
appellant answered the phone. Despite remembering this phone 
call, these defense witnesses had very little recall of 
appellant's activity on the aay of the burglary. Evidence was 
also offered that appellant had received a late call from his 
sister or sister-in-law telling him the police were looking 
for him (T. 44 and 56), but none of the defense witnesses 
remembered this seemingly significant call. 
There was also testimony that appellant always left 
his wallet and keys in his truck at night and used his spare 
key to get in the truck in the morning. When Detective 
Rringhurst informed appellant that he would need another key 
in order to get the truck from the impound lot (since the set 
which had been se izea by the police follow_ing the burglary was 
now part of the evidence), appellant told Bringhurst that 
there was not another set of truck keys (T. R0-81). 
Appellant has failed to show reason why the court 
could not fina officer Smith's account of the burglary and his 
consecutive identification of appellant as the burglar 
sufficienty persuasive to aispel any ooubts raised by the 
defense witnesses. The trial juoge in the instant case was 
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under no obligation to accept any view of the evin0nc0 nor 
compelled to accept the most incredible inferences. l\s t'1e 
trier of fact the judge considered all the facts shown and 
drew the reasonable inferences therefrom. The rule is that 
the evidence depends upon what the jury regards as substantial 
and credible. State v. John, Utah, 58h P.2d 410 (1978). 
Therefore, the fact that Judge Wilkinson found Officer Smith's 
testimony more credible than the defense witnesses indicates 
that he had no reasonable doubt as to appellant's quilt. That 
Judge Wilkinson was not persuaded by appellant's alibi defense 
does not mean that his guilty verdict was based upon 
insufficient evidence. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT'S OBJECTIOP IS tJFITHER TIMELY 
NOR SPECIFIC AND IS NOT A PROPER BASIS OF 
APPEAL BEFORE THE COURT. 
Appellant contends that Officer Smith's in-court 
identification was tainted and should not have been admitted, 
however, this objection was never raised at trial. Rule 4, 
Utah Rules of Evidence, provides in pertinent part that, 
"A verdict or finding shall not be set 
aside, nor shall the judgment or decision 
based thereon be reversed by reason of the 
erroneous admission of evidence unless (a) 
there appears of record objection to the 
evidence timely interposed and so stated 
as to make clear the srecific ground of 
objection • 
The credibility of the identification was questioned 
but not its admissibility. Even now the basis of appellant's 
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nh1 ect ion is unclear. He never asks for the evidence to be 
stricken, apparently contending only that it was given too 
'" llCh crede nee by the trial judge. As has been previously 
shown, the question of witness credibility falls squarely in 
the lap of the trier of fact. 
This Court has previously held that the proper 
procedure to follow concerning an allegedly suspect 
identification is a motion to suppress the identification 
testimony before trial. The second alternative is a defense 
motion to suppress during the trial. State v. McGee, 24 Utah 
2d 396, 4 7 3 P.2d 388 (1970). Neither of these procedures was 
followed by defense counsel even though he was aware of the 
viewing prior to trial. 
In State v. Mccardell, 652 P.2d 947, the Court 
endorsed the contemporaneous objection rule requiring a 
"timely and specific objection to admission of evidence in 
order for the question of admissiblity to be considered on 
appeal." The purpose of the rule is to afford the trial court 
an opportunity to address the Clefendant's concern and proceed 
with evidence most relevant to the case. The Court further 
held in Mccardell that a new trial should not be granted as a 
result of the defendant's failure to provide the trial court 
with that opportunity. 
Appellant has not made a clear objection to the 
admission of Officer Smith's testimony at any point in this 
proceeding. Therefore, appellant's contention that Officer 
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Smith's in-court identificatinn was tainted by seeing 
appellant in Officer Bringhurst's office is not reviewahle by 
this court. 
POINT III 
UNDER THE "TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES" 
TEST, OFFICER S ORSERVATION OF THE 
APPELLANT WAS NOT TAINTED. 
In recent years both the United States Supreme Court 
and the Utah Supreme Court have ruled upon the admissibility 
of in-court identifications where the witness has particpated 
in an iilentification procedure prior to trial. In Stovall v. 
Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), the Court established a "totality 
of the circumstances" test to be used in determining whether a 
previous contact had tainted the identification. It was later 
held that each case was to be determined on its own facts and 
a pretrial identification should be set aside only if the 
procedure was so suggestive as to give rise to a "substantial 
likelihood of irreparable misidentification." Neil v. 
Biggers, 409 U.S. 1R8, 196 (1972). This standard shifted the 
focus to the reliability of the identification rather than the 
circumstances under which it was made. Therefore, the central 
issue is whether under the totality of the circumstances the 
iilentification was reliable even if the confrontation was 
suggestive. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977). 
-10-
Utah has adopted the "totality of the circumstances" 
test citing the following as factors to be considered in de-
t r, rm in i ng re 1iahi1 i ty : 
(1) the witness's opportunity to view the 
criminal at the time of the crime, 
(2) the witness's degree of attention, 
(3) the accuracy of any prior description 
of the suspect, 
( 4) the level of certainty during the 
identification procedure, and 
( 5) the time between the crime and the 
identification. State v. Mccumber, Utah, 
622 P.2d 353 (1980). 
In addition, the identification process is not impermissible 
unless it can be shown that some external, suggestive 
influence so tainted the identification procedure that the 
witness would almost inevitably identify the defendant. 
State v. Wilson, Utah, 608 P.2d 1237 (19fl0). 
It is unclear precisely what appellant is arguing. 
He argues that Officer Smith's identification was tainted by 
viewing appellant in Detective Rringhurst's office but makes 
no showing that the identification was unreliable or that an 
identification of appellant was the inevitable result of the 
Bringhurst interview. Nor is there anything in the record to 
suggest that Officer Smith's identification was so tainted as 
to create a "substantial likelihood of misidentification." 
Officer Smith certainly observed the commission of the crime. 
Smith testified that the area around the Rainbo Station seemed 
fairly well-lighted. He observed appellant from the time he 
exited the Rainbo Station until he entered his truck. After 
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appellant entered his truck, ()ffirer S01ith t0stifircl that he 
grabbed hold of the other passenqer and paid partirular 
attention to appellant while he was hackinq nut his truck fen 
approximately 75 feet. Apparently Offirrr Smith rlid nnt giv0 
a description of the burqlar although it was likely 
unnecessary based upon his identification of the appellant 
from his driver's license. 
Later that afternoon, Officer Smith saw appellant 
Detective Bringhurst's office. When asked if he could irlen-
tify appellant, Smith was initially uncertain. Officer 
left to conduct his other husiness, then returned. 
observed appellant and listenerl to him speak at which point he 
made an identification. There is nothing in the recorrl which 
suggests that this irlentification was not the prorluct of 
Smith's independent and reliable recollection of the previous 
events of that day concerning the gas station hurglary. 
This Court has held it to be a function of the jury 
to determine whether the witness actually recognizes the de-
fendant in court. It is to be det:ermined as a !'1atter of fact. 
State v. Spencer, 24 Utah 2cl 361. 471 P.2d 873 (1970). \-lhen A 
question concerning an identification is raised, it should be 
decided in the trial court whether there was anything so sug-
gestive that there is a reasonable likelihoorl the recollection 
of the witness was tainted or distorted. This finding should 
only be disturbed if there has clearly heen an error. State 
v. Perry, 27 Utah 2d 4R, 492 P.2d 1349 (1972). In State v. 
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Utah, 6 57 P. 2d 2R9 ( 1982), this court he la that 
'"'i discrepancy involving an in-court identification was a 
11JattPr of credihility of the evidence, not admissiblity. 
''t»dihility and the weight to be given the evidence is a 
mrltt0r for the jury to decide. Thus, it follows that it is 
the prerogative of the lower court to determine if Officer 
Smith's testimony was reliable and based on independent 
recollections of the event. Any difficulty he may have 
experienced in identifying appellant in Detective Rringhurst's 
Office goes merely to the weight and credibility of the 
evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The issue from the appellant's view seems to be that 
of necessity a reasonable doubt must exist because of the 
admission of conflicting testimony. This Court has held on 
several occasions, however, that it is the prerogative of the 
trier of fact to decide the weight and credibility to be given 
the evidence. It would be impossible to ever have a 
conviction if the presence of conflicting testimony 
automatically mandated a finding of reasonable doubt. 
In addition, appellant questions the validity of Of-
ficer Smith's testimony but his objection is neither timely 
nor specific. He fails to state a clear objection to this 
testimony and contends only that it was given too much weight, 
thPrefore, the appeal is not properly before the court. 
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Regarding the issue of nfficer Scnith's te>sti"lony, 
both this court and the United States Supreme rourt have 
established the "totality of the circumstances" test wher0 
reliability of the identification is the point of focus 
regardless of any suspect viewing. There was no showing that 
Officer Smith's in-court identification was not re>liahle nor 
that there was a "substantial, likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification." For these reasons, appellant's conviction 
should be 
1984. 
upheld. //'7 
Respectfully submitted day of January, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
AttornPy General 
General 
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